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Foreword
This report is an outcome of The Implementation of EU Environmental Policies: Efficiency
Issues (IMPOL) project. The IMPOL project involved four research institutes (CERNA,
Ecole des Mines de Paris, SPRU – Science and Technology Policy Research University of
Sussex, CSTM, University of Twente, UFZ Leipzig-Halle) and was funded by the European
Commission's DGXII under its Environment and Climate Programme (contract ENV4-
CT97-0569) and national institutions (including ADEME, the French environmental
agency). As its name suggests, the project concerned the implementation of EU
environmental legislation. It sought to answer questions such as:
1. Does implementation result in the attainment of the environmental goals set out in EU
Directives?
2. How does implementation affect the cost effectiveness of a particular environmental
policy?
The core of the project consisted of the ex post evaluation of the implementation
outcomes of selected pieces of EU legislation in four Member States (France, Germany, the
Netherlands and the United Kingdom). Three cases studies were evaluated: Directive
regulating emissions from existing domestic waste incinerators (89/429); the Directive on
emissions of SO2 and NOX from Large Combustion Plants (88/609); and, the Council
Regulation on the Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (1863/93) or EMAS.
IMPOL research reports are available at      http://www.cerna.ensmp.fr/Progeuropeens/IMPOL     .
For further information, please contact:
Matthieu Glachant
CERNA - Ecole des Mines de Paris
60, boulevard Saint-Michel
F- 75272 Paris cedex 06
Tel: +33 1 40 51 90 91
Fax: +33 1 44 07 10 46
glachant@cerna.ensmp.fr
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1. Introduction
Within the context of the IMPOL project several fields of European environmental policy
are studied on aspects as national implementation and environmental and efficiency
outcomes. For the IMPOL project a case study was done on the transformation of the
Dutch electricity sector in the context of the European Directive 88/609/EEC. The
indicators used in this report for environmental effectiveness, allocative efficiency,
productive efficiency and administrative costs were chosen in line with a coordinating
document (Eames, 1999).
The European Directive 88/609/EEC regulates Large Combustion Plants on their SO2 and
Nox emissions. These emissions are relevant for air quality and for the acidification
problem. In the empirical part of this report emphasis is laid on the power plants as a
specific sub-group of the large combustion plants.
The report starts in chapter 2 with a description of the Dutch policy on acidification and
regulation that existed when 88/609/EEC was issued. This way it is clarified that the formal
implementation of the European Directive was done in the Netherlands with very little
effort. In section 2.4 some major information on the structure of the electricity production
sector is given as well as some insights into developments. In section 2.5 details on a
covenant to reduce emissions from power plants is given. The electricity sector and the
government agreed upon this document as a binding agenda for change. In section 2.6
information on monitoring and enforcement is given.
In chapter 3, the environmental outcomes are discussed. First the emissions of all large
combustion plants are presented in time series. Within the IMPOL research-team the
decision was taken to concentrate on the SO2 emissions of power plants. Therefor, secondly
the SO2 emissions of the power plants and the individual power plants are presented. This
opens the possibility for an analysis of the found decrease of SO2 emissions. In section 3.3
the likely causes and their weight are assessed. In section 3.5 some conclusions about
environmental effectiveness are formulated.
In chapter 4 the allocative efficiency of adjustments is elaborated. First the SO2 abatement
patterns of individual plants are presented, followed by the way the costs were distributed in
the electricity sector. Finally the costs for individual measures and plants are elaborated.
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In chapter 5 the freedom to choose between alternatives to meet the SO2 demands is
discussed. Although there was a covenant with SO2 and Nox implemented in the
Netherlands with targets on the aggregate level of the sector, the actual freedom to choose,
the allocative efficiency was seriously limited by existing regulation. In chapter 6 an
assessment of administrative costs is given. Finally in chapter 7 some summarizing
conclusions are drawn.
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2. Implementing directive 88/609/EEC
in the Netherlands
The implementation of EU directive 88/609/EEC in the Netherlands was done with very
little effort. In order to understand this, the strategic position of the Netherlands in
international games, the policy on acidification policy and the legislation in use for Large
Combustion Plants since 1987 has to be understood. This will be explained in section 2.1. In
section 2.2 the prospects on the acidification policy are described. The formal
implementation of the European Directive 88/609/EEC is described in section 2.3. In
section 2.4 the analysis is focussed on the Dutch covenant upon which the government and
the electricity sector agreed upon. This covenant aims at lowering the emissions of
electricity plants. The covenant can be interpreted, but certainly not causal linked to, the
reduction objectives/emission reduction plans that are mentioned in 88/906/EEC.
2.1. Dutch policy and legislation existing when 88/609/EEC was issued
Policy on acidification
Dutch policy on acidification started in the late seventies. This policy was not only driven
by arguments to fight acidification, it was preliminary launched as an instrument to control
and improve air-quality. Both elements are of course interrelated. Already in 1983, in the
Indicative Multi-Year Program Air Pollution 1985-1986, targets for the year 2000 for the
emissions of SO2, Nox and NH3 and VOS were formulated (Second Chamber of Parliament,
1985-1989, 18605 nrs 1-2). In 1987 there was regulation issued that set limits on the SO2
and Nox emissions of large combustion plants. For new power plants SO2 abatement
equipment became unavoidable and also existing plants knew that there life-span was
limited. After 1985 "environment" and especially "acidification" became empathic subjects
in the Netherlands, both in public opinion and in politics. Information became available
about the serious harm of the acidification problem. Signals from Germany about massive
“Waldsterben” were combined with national signals. A substantial research program on the
processes and effects of acidification was called for and started: the Additional Program
Acidification Research.
The years 1985-1987 were the period in which the World-commission on Environment and
Development (widely known as the “Brundtland Commission”) prepared the report “Our
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common future” (1987). Parallel an in depth-study was done on the Dutch situation and the
outcomes were as pessimistic as they became influential. This comprehensive inventory
with explorations for the future was done by the National Institute of Public Health and the
Environment (In dutch: Rijksinstituut voor de Volksgezondheid en Milieuhygiene, in short:
RIVM). The RIVM studies and reports on the state of the Dutch environment. The report
of the RIVM was published in 1988 and had huge impacts. Environmental affairs became
real issues in politics and in the public opinion. The report can be qualified as the most
important driver for the innovative and far reaching first integral National Environmental
Plan that was issued on May, 25 th 1989. The plan that was issues by four Ministers: The
Ministry of Housing, Physical Planning and Environmental affairs, the Ministry of
Economic Affairs, the Ministry of Agriculture and Fishery and the Ministry of Traffic and
Water Management were involved. The focus was shifted from a sector approach (water,
air, surface) to an integral approach. The target group policy was introduced. With target
groups distinguished such as the industry, the power sector, agriculture, consumers, waste-
sector and traffic. A really ambitious agenda for change was formulated in the first National
Environmental Plan.
How big “environment” as an issue was at that time can be understood even better when we
go a bit into political developments at that time. The Minister of Environment did present
the first National Environmental Plan as an outgoing minister. The cabinet fell while
anticipating the first National Environmental Plan. In order to push-back traffic and
pollution by traffic, the tax regime should be changed. Traveling expenses for commuter
traffic were going to be made less tax-deductible. The members of parliament did not
support this initiative of the cabinet. The cabinet was “conservative/Christian-liberal”
coalition. The minister of Environment was also a liberal.
Elections were held and the electoral contest was dominated by discussions how to adopt to
sustainability in socio-economic systems. The liberal party did suffer for its little
environmental friendly policy. The new cabinet was a coalition of the conservative
Christian party and labor party. The formation of the cabinet was under constant time
pressure. The general thought was that “there was not time to spill given the important
issues at stake that had to be taken care of”. The impact of the study of the National
Institute of Public Health and the Environment was later once again recognized: such kind
of study is know done every 2 years.
In the first National Environmental Plan the official goal of the acidification policy was to
reduce acid emissions by 70-80% in 2000 in order to preserve woods and nature reserves.
Recognized is that because of efforts of industry and power plants the SO2 emissions are
decreasing since 1980. Nevertheless power plants had to reduce from 65 kilotons/year in
1985 to 30 kilotons SO2/year in 2000. Industry had to reduce from 69 kilotons/year in
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1985 to 15 kilotons /year in 2000. Refineries had to reduce from 95 kilotons/year in 1985
to 36 kilotons /year in 2000. Traffic and households had to reduce from 47 kilotons/year in
1985 to 24 kilotons /year in 2000. For the period after 2000 an additional effort is
announced.
This policy document was followed by the more concrete National Plan for Fighting
Acidification (Second Chamber of Parliament, 1988-1989, 18225, nr.31). Targets for 2000
and 2010 were formulated both quality targets and emission targets. First the emission
targets were formulated for each target group, par example the agriculture sector, traffic,
industry, refineries, electricity-plants. The environmental activists, the literature and the
consultation councils thought the tempo of emission-abatement was still too slow. Still
deposition of acidification-equivalents decreased between 1980 and 1995, a full 73% as SO2
is at stake, 16% when NOx is at stake and 25% when NH3 is at stake (Keizer, 1997).
Because the Dutch National Plan for Fighting Acidification (TK 1988-1989) required a
decrease of 80 % for the year 2000, compared to the SO2 emissions of 1980, there are no
further obligations within the international protocols that the Netherlands subscribed: in
1985 the Netherlands signed the Helsinki protocol which required a 30% decrease of SO2
(compared to 1980). The United Kingdom, the United Nations of America and the South-
European countries did not sign. Developments in several countries were more positive than
expected and that made the so-called Oslo-Protocol of June, 14th 1994 attainable. The
reduction percentages are in table 1:
Table 1: % reductions, compared to 1980
2000 2005 2010
Netherlands 77
Germany 83 87
France 74 72 79
United Kingdom 50 70 80
Source: V.G. Keizer, 1997
Of course the Directive 88/609/EEC was, for the EU Member States, an important step in
between both protocols. Nevertheless this should for the Netherlands not to be perceived as
an argument that any abatement is caused by the European Directive or by the Oslo
protocol. It was indeed the Netherlands that was one of the driving forces in the
international acidification-policy, that led to a situation that also other countries are
required to stricter emission abatement. The fact that Dutch government is motivated to
press for a more progressive policy on acidification can easily be understood by the fact
that about 75% of the acid deposition in the Netherlands is caused by foreign countries
(RIVM, Milieubalans, 1988).
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Dutch legislation when EU directive 88/609/EEC was issued
An Important instrument in order to implement the policy on acidification were limits set
by the Dutch Act on Air Pollution (in short: WLV). Under this legal regime in 1987 a
directive on emissions from large combustion plants came into force as predecessor of
guidelines for permitting authorities. In short this was called “Bees WLV” ( Stb. 1987,
1987). This directive applied on combustion plants with a thermal capacity of more than
75 MW. For smaller combustion plants there was the Bees HW. The mean reason for this
split up was that the competent authorities were different. Large combustion plants had to
meet the requirements of a sector law that controlled air-pollution (Bees WLV). The
competent authorities for the permits and monitoring and enforcement are the provinces.
For smaller combustion plants the competent authorities were, in most cases, municipalities
(Bees HW).
2.2. Prospects on the acidification policy
Changes in the economic structure of the electricity sector that will be discussed in section
2.4, led to a strong focus on costs within the sector nowadays. The raised national
competition and the strongly raised international competition make this inescapable. Being
a front runner on environmental demands makes companies often less competitive. The
electricity sector already meets the demands for 2010 on SO2, on Nox a lot still has to be
done. Voluntary agreement on this is not within reach. The government nowadays thinks
about a unified approach for refineries, industry and power plants. Thoughts are about a SO2
and NOx funds, being the emphasis on Nox. A certain level of marginal abatement costs
probably will be fixed. Thoughts are about 5000 guilders/ton SO2 abated and 10.000
guilders/ton Nox. Companies that are above this level get money out of the funds.
Companies that do not demonstrate that they have reached this level of abatement have to
pay. Still these thoughts are in the phase of policy making. A lot of implementation
problems still have to be solved, final decisions are not made yet. On aggregate level the
target for acidification (1400 acid equivalents in 2010) will not be reached easily. The
expectations are therefor ongoing efforts both national as in the international arena.
2.3. Formal integration of EU 88/609/EEC
In order to meet all the formal requirements of EU 88/609/EEC, Bees WLV was adjusted
July 5th, 1991 (Stb. 354). Important to note is that the Dutch government used their
competence to raise the ambition level and, with other words, lower the emission standards
as set by the Directive 88/609/EEC. This was done in order to reach for the goals of the
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Dutch acidification policy that already was structured. The countries of comparison
according to the responsible people at the Dutch Ministry were Germany and the United
States of America. The developments at the level of the European Union were of no
importance for the core of policy and legislation concerning Large Combustion Plants.
Figure 2: Emission limits Large Combustion Plants in the Netherlands by Bees WLV 1991
(des. = desulferication)
New plants 300 MW or more SO2 mg/m3 Nox mg/m3 Dust mg/m3
Coal 400 (des. 85%) 650 (permitted before 1/8/88)
400 (permitted after 1/8/88)
50 (20-50)
Oil 400 (des. 85%) 450 (permitted before 1/8/88)
300 (permitted after 1/8/88)
Gas 35 350 (permitted before 1/8/88)
200 (permitted after 1/8/88)
New plants less than 300 MW SO2 mg/m3 Nox mg/m3 Dust mg/m3
Coal 700 650 (permitted before 1/8/88)
500 (permitted after 1/8/88)
50 (20-50)
Oil 1700 450 (permitted before 1/8/88)
300 (permitted after 1/8/88)
Gas 35 350 (permitted before 1/8/88)
200 (permitted after 1/8/88)
Existing plants 300 MW or
more
SO2 mg/m3 Nox mg/m3 Dust mg/m3
Coal 400 (after 1/12/89) for plants in
function after 1994 or 1999, des.
85%, otherwise max S 0,8% for
plants until 1994 or 1999
1000 (after 1/12/89) for plants
with a life of more than 10000
hours, (800-1000)
Oil 400 (after 1/12/89) for plants in
function after 1994, others: 1700
mg/m3
700 (after 1/12/89) with a life
expectancy of more than10000
hours (450-700)
Gas As new plants (after 1/1/88) 500 for plants with a life of
more(after 1/1/89)
As new plants (after 1/12/89)
Existing plants less than 300
MW
SO2 mg/m3 Nox mg/m3 Dust mg/m3
Coal max. 0,8% S in electricity plant
Oil 1700 (after 1/6/87) 700 (after 1/12/89) with a life of
more than 10000 hours (450-700)
Gas As new plants (after 1/1/88) 500 (after 1/1/89) for plants with a
life of more than 10000 hours
(500-450)
As new plants (after 1/12/89)
There were however a few technicalities changed in Bees WLV 1987 in order to meet the
formal requirements of EU 88/609/EEC: At the moment that the Directive 88/609 was
translated into Dutch legislation the difference between large and small was adjusted towards
the EEC Directive: 50 MW. Large is defined as larger than 50 MW (thermal capacity).
Different from the EEC Directive, emission limits are divided in two categories: 50 - 300
MW and larger than 300 MW. The difference between `new’ and `existing’ combustion
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plants is used. But what a `new’ plant is, is not defined. `New’ is the plant that is not
`existing’. Existing combustion plants are those plants that are permitted before May, 29th,
1987. `New’ is a combustion plant when it is permitted on or after May, 29th, 1987 or when
the burners and ovens are renewed. The date is a bit different from July, 1th, 1987 that is
given in the 88/609/EEC. The difference is minor.
A lot of standards that are required by the Bees WLV 1987 are stricter, so more ambitious,
than the emission requirements that are prescribed by the directive 88/609/EEC. So it
wasn’t necessary to adjust most emission requirements in Bees WLV. There is one
exception: new coal-fuelled combustion plants, that were permitted before August 1st,
1988, were not allowed to emit more than 800 mg NOx/m3 according to Bees WLV. For
these combustion plants the emission standard is adjusted into 650 mg/m3 NOx, in
accordance with the directive 88/609/EEC.
But the competent authorities may again deviate from the emission requirements and ask
for even stricter emissions or additional requirements in their permits. There are also some
possibilities to raise the requirements on emission to a less ambitious level (art. 28 Bees
WLV). But at least the Inspector of Environment has to be a partner in this process. These
possibilities are limited: the levels set by the directive 88/609/EEC are always the upper
limit. The European adjustment 1995 is already in practice in the Netherlands. It made no
adjustment of regulation in the Netherlands necessary.
Formal non-compliance to 88/609/EEC: Procedures of malfunction and interruption of fuel
supply
On one specific feature too little attention was paid during the translation of 88/609/EEC
into Dutch legislation: On July, 20 th, 1993 Dutch government was informed that the
European Commission was of the opinion that Bees WLV interpreted article 8 of 88/609
wrong. This article deals with procedures in case of malfunction, interruption of the supply
of low-sulphur fuel or sudden interruption in the gas-supply. The criticism only related to
the new plants (permitted on or after July, 1th, 1987). On January, 6th 1995 the Bees WLV
was changed in accordance to the demands from the European Commission. On that
occasion also the procedures for malfunction of combustion plants that use solid fuels or
`heavy’ fuel oil were changed (high on sulphur; article 7 of 88/609). Normally this concerns
plants with a thermal capacity of more than 300 MW, also plants that produce electricity.
Although the European Commission made no remarks, equal gaps with regard to article 7
were present and repaired. In the Dutch Ministry this was perceived as a minor
misunderstanding with no real consequences other than just a formality.
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2.4. Electricity sector and energy policy
The 1989 Electricity law regulated the legal structure of the electricity sector. The limited
liability company “NV Samenwerkende Electriciteitsproduktiebedrijven” (in short: Sep) is a
central player in the system. The four large electricity producers in the Netherlands own
the Sep: EPON, UNA, EZH and EPZ. This law legalized grown structures. Between the
producers and the Sep there is a collaboration agreement. The Sep and this agreement was
first realized in 1949 and changed often since then. Essential is that the producers were
obliged to keep there capacity and locations in line with the Electricity plan. Every two
years the Sep had to draw up an Electricity plan. The Sep was responsible for coordinating
supply and demand of electricity and especially for the public supply of electricity. The
Ministry of Economic Affairs has a say in the Electricity plan and also in the electricity
prizes. Nevertheless, the Sep managed for the production costs a national pooling prize. In
the research period the Sep dealt with import and export of electricity, the collective
purchase of fuels, the pooling of fuel and pooling of production costs and the operational
switch on and switch off of individual plants. So Sep coordinated production. Finally the Sep
operated a financial counting program that is computerized and is, including environmental
costs, the basis for settlement of variety in cost prizes of different power plants.
Normally it is the policy that power plants are equipped to function on more than one fuel.
In early years the producers free in the choice of fuels. This freedom was since the seventies
restricted. Until the early seventies it was expected, and the Sep promoted, the increase of
natural gas as fuel in power plants with oil as second fuel. Gas could be switched of during
winter. Production on oil was the alternative, being switched of if the air quality standards
on SO2 were exceeded. The oil crises in the early seventies, the Netherlands suffered under
an oil boycott, changed this policy. International agreements within the International
Energy Agency and the European Union led to prioritize oil and coal.
A national policy on the use of fuels was formulated by the end of the seventies. An
agreement on the use of fuels was discussed between the electricity sector and the national
government (both environmental affairs and economic affairs). Since 1980 there is a plan
for the use of fuels in power plants (Brandstofinzetplan Centrales). First it aimed at a
maximum proportion of coal, the emissions of SO2 should be decreased and energy saved.
Nuclear power still was an option that could be expanded. In those years it was expected
that more coal and more oil were going to be used. Since 1974 more units were built that
could burn oil. Uncertainties on the supply of oil and prize development bended back this
development. Since Tjernobyl nuclear power is out. Sep looked for another secure and
cheap fuel and again coal was prioritized. The advantage of its low prize is partially undone
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by the necessary investments for environmental protection. The same problem holds for
oil and, also because reduced gas-prizes, the use of gas in gas/oil equipped plants increased
since 1985. For the research period the inputs of fuels are analyzed and found reasonable
stable. Nowadays the use of coal is once again questioned. Not because of the SO2 and Nox
emissions but because of the relatively high CO2 emissions.
On the economic structure of the electricity- producing sector (Arentsen et al, 1997):
Merging led to a decrease of companies from 16 in 1984 to a number of 4 in the research
years. The described system is a co-ordinated oligopoly, and in fact a monopoly.
Nevertheless there was some overproduction during the research period. This was caused by
the fact that de-central capacity increased. For environmental reasons the government
supported decentralised electricity production. Industry installed combined heat and power
technology. This capacity was not integrated in the Electricity plan, and so overproduction
was introduced. Some industries sold electricity to the electricity distributor. This way,
already during the research period the number of electricity producing companies was
increased. The European Union speeded up things demanding competition and open
markets. The four Dutch electricity producers talked about merging but did not until today.
Since 1992 European and national debates on the liberalisation of the power production
sector is going on. Nowadays large foreign companies try to buy one or more of the four
Dutch electricity producers in order to enter directly the Dutch market on a large-scale
basis. Small consumers still have to buy from the regional distributor, large companies can
chose their own distributor. Negotiations are going on between two of the large Dutch
electricity producers about foreign take-over. The sale is likely to be agreed upon. Of course
this has large consequences. There is some manoeuvring going on to maintain as much as
possible protection of the market and the pooling system. Still the consequences for the
willingness to accept stricter environmental constraints are large. Until today the electricity
producers are not willing to agree on a second covenant. They are afraid of the influence of
rising environmental costs on their competitiveness. This explains the strategically change
on the instrumentation on the policy side as has been discussed in paragraph 2.2.
2.5. Voluntary agreement on the reduction of SO2 and NOx emissions from power
plants
With regard to existing combustion plants, the European Member States had to implement
a plan to reduce the emissions in order to achieve the levels that are required by
88/609/EEC. The Member States may choose the instruments they want to use. The
Netherlands did use the Bees WLV1987 and 1991 and a voluntary agreement to transform
the electricity sector. This transformation is however not causally linked the European
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Directive but to the Dutch acidification policy. In fact a voluntary agreement was reached
with the electricity sector for an additional effort until the year 2000 on top of the Bees
1987 and 1991.
This agreement was reached under the threat of additional and stricter regulation on SO2
and Nox. The cause of all this was therefor not 88/609/EEC but the Dutch acidification
policy.
For the studied period 1990-1996, a covenant was agreed upon between governments and
the electricity sector.
The covenant
Involved parties, their motives and interests
The covenant is agreed on by the Dutch central government, represented by the Ministry
on Housing, Physical planning and the Environment, the limited liability company “NV
Samenwerkende Electriciteitsproduktiebedrijven” (in short: SEP), the individual electricity
plants and twelve provinces. The individual electricity companies authorized the limited
liability company (under private law as most large private companies) to sign the covenant.
The shareholders of the Sep are the four large electricity producers: EPON, UNA, EZH and
EPZ.
According to the representatives of the Dutch Ministry of Housing, the parties engaged in
the negotiations as usual. This means that first of all, negotiations were engaged under the
threat of regulation. Government left no doubt that whenever parties did not reach an
agreement voluntary, regulation will follow. Full-fledged goal attainment for acidification
was on the agenda of the representatives of the Ministry. The goals to be reached were non-
negotiable. On the side of the power plants, the typical behavior of large combustion plants
was observed. There was reluctance to end-of-pipe measures. Industry normally tries to gain
as much flexibility as possible and tries to gain absolute freedom in reaching the emission
ceilings agreed upon. Whenever expectations are that secondary measures are necessary for
electricity plants, negotiations harden. This was also the case during the negotiations on the
voluntary agreement in the electricity sector. But the Sep also tried to lower the goals to be
reached for. It soon became clear to them that this was not attainable and the thread of
stricter regulation was too serious for the electricity sector, especially for the existing
plants. Still a settlement for malfunctions of abatement equipment was added to the
covenant. Existing regulation made end-of pipe technology for SO2 abatement already
inevitable for new plants and eventually inevitable for existing plants. So in this perspective
the fight was on the Nox emissions and the prescription of end-of-pipe technology.
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The covenant did not add anything to the emission requirements for SO2 for every
individual power plant. Consequently the sector of power plants were not confronted with
any additional requirements in terms of concentrations on existing plants. The 400mg/m3
combustion gas limit on SO2 did not require any new technology on top of BEES. This level
can be achieved by 85 % abatement, 1.27 % S-coal. Nevertheless the overall emission
ceiling for the sector as a whole was established much lower in the covenant and in line with
the policy documents mentioned. Some plant did not install the necessary end-of pipe
technology yet. The trade-off was made for old coal-fired electricity plants that until
closing down (before 1995) the plants were allowed to produce without additional demands
on top of Bees- WLV 1987/1991. For plants larger than 300 MW that were still in use after
1994, 85% desulfurication of combustion gasses is required in Bees. These plants were not
obliged to install end-of pipe technology, nevertheless as far as SO2 is at stake, in a material
sense there are no alternatives for coal-fired plants. The emissions limit and 85%
abatement is achieved cost-effective with a wet washer.
The real bottleneck in the negotiations was in the emission ceiling for NOx. It was apparent
that NSCR/SCR technology was necessary. The power plants required total freedom in the
choice of either primary or secondary measures. Basically they have gotten that. For the
central government and the SEP there were also some considerations in order to secure
electricity supply. Diversity on fuels was therefor appreciated. For that coal-fired plants are
desirable next to gas fired plants. Normally the gas-fired plants can also be fired on oil. If
they use oil SO2 emissions are up. But oil is rarely fired in these electricity plants, mostly
this concerns days on which it is extreme cold, in order to relieve gas supply. On these
dominantly gas fired small plants, no SO2 abatement technology is required. Of course
recently coal-fired plants are brought into disrepute at the level of the central government
because, in comparison with gas-fired plants, they produce substantially more CO2.
The outcomes of the game
The outcomes were satisfying for both parties. A substantial reduction of SO2 and NOx
emissions was combined with freedom for the electricity sector to implement in the most
cost-effective way. The goals were on the aggregate level of the sector and not on the level
of individual electricity plants.
The consequence of the covenant that was signed on June 12th 1990 in detail:
Obligations for the year 2000 for the electricity sector
The Limited Liability Company SEP and the individual electricity plants committed
themselves to substantial efforts to decrease the emissions of SO2 and NOx between 1990
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and 2000. This decrease is defined on the aggregate level of the electricity plants. The
emission ceiling of the year 2000 is 18000 tons SO2 and 30000 tons NOx . For the year
1994 the ceiling for SO2 emissions is 30000 tons. So the tempo on reduction of SO2 is
faster than in the policy documents mentioned.
In case of malfunction of desulfurication equipment in coal fired electricity plants, and the
plant is within legal limits, the emission ceiling is raised by 4000 tons SO2. This corrected
ceiling can be exceeded by 3000 tons once every three years.
Within a period of six month a plan had to be produced by the SEP that explained how the
sector is going to be restructured in order to reach for the targets. This plan was object of
interaction with a commission. The provinces appointed two members the Minister of
Housing, Physical Planning and Environmental Affairs appointed two members to this
commission, and two were appointed by the SEP. In every even year the SEP had to
present a report to the commission on the implementation of the covenant. Basic success-
factor of this covenant is believed to be that it is not about endeavors but about results. If
results are not achieved regulation will follow and prescription of technology will follow.
Plan for the implementation of the covenant
It is important to notice that the SEP was in the period 1988-1995 extreme powerful
within the electricity sector. They coordinated even the application of individual power
plants and there was a system settlement/balancing of cost prices. Only recently
liberalization and the growing level of competition changed this situation. In 1999 the SEP
was dismantled. In the period 1988-1995 they were however ruling the electricity sector.
Basically there were four corporate electricity producers: EPO, UNA, EZH and EPZ. The
allocation of emission reduction over these four producers and their individual plants was no
problem. The SEP operated a system of cost-price settlement/balancing. Next figure gives
the expectations of the SEP on emissions of SO2. Choices already made seemed to make the
1994 SO2 ceiling attainable, to reach out for the 2000 SO2 ceiling some additional choices
had to be made.
Figure 3: Kilotons emissions SO2 expected by the SEP in 1991 (source: Plan van Aanpak
1991)
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
54 45 43 30 33 32 31 33 33 26
A first type of instrument was the closedown of five coal-fueled plants that had no
abatement equipment for SO2. These plants were “Gelderland 12”, “Amer 41”, “Amer 51”,
“Maascentrale 4” en “Maascentrale 5”. Finally will the “Maascentrale 6” was planned to be
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closed down in 1999/2000.
Two new coal-fueled plants will be put into operation: “Amer 91 and “”Hemweg 8”.
In the year 2000, after the last “old plant” “Maascentrale 6” should be closed, all coal-
fueled plants will have abatement equipment for SO2. This concerns the existing units
“Gelderland13”, “Maasvlakte1”, “Maasvlakte2”, “Borssele12”, “Amer81” and the new
units “Amer91” and “Hemweg8”.
Additional abatement is expected from low-sulfur coal, abatement of more than 90% and
less malfunctions in the abatement equipment.
Progress reports
The implementation of the “Plan for the implementation of the government” was reported
every even year. This means that the first report issued in 1992 covers the years 1990 and
1991. The fourth report covered the years 1996 and 1997. The most important events:
-The plant “Gelderland 12” was closed down late 1990
-The plant “Maascentrale 4” was closed down late 1991
-The plant “Amer 41” was closed down (replaced by “Amer 91”)
- The plant “Amer 51” was closed down (replaced by Amer 91”)
- The plant “Maascentrale 5” was closed down
- The plant “Maascentrale 6” was planned to be closed down late 1999 or early 2000,
actually it was closed down early 1997.
Put in operation new coal-fueled plants with full abatement equipment:
- Amercentrale 9 (A-91) 1/7/93 (replaces Amer 41 and Amer 51)
- Hemwegcentrale (HW-8) 1/7/94
The progress reports gave data on emissions, % S in coal used, and additional emissions
because of malfunctions. Where relevant the data will be reported that will be used in the
next paragraph.
Adjustments in the Dutch electricity producing sector Kris Lulofs
Research Paper 2000-B-4 18
2.6. Monitoring and enforcement
The Sep came up with the required plan for the reduction of emmissions within six months.
This plan was object of interaction with the commission. The commission approved of the
plan.
As mentioned, the Sep had to produce a report on the progress made every two years.
Meetings between the Sep and the commission were always held in a positive atmosphere
and satisfying for Sep, central government and provinces. The reason for all this is of
course very simple: implementation was done according plan and the goals were achieved.
Of course sometimes a technique of technologies did not perform as was expected. For that
reason some of the about seventy measures being planned were altered. Most frequently this
was the case for Nox emissions, technology for SO2 was already more mature.
Nevertheless there were three points of more serious discussions (Brand, 1999): One of
them is the easy realization of the reduction of SO2 emissions. This was something the
provinces didn't like and reinforced them in the idea that maybe with regulation even more
could have been achieved. Part of the covenant was of course that provinces would not
make regulation in permits more strict as long as the electricity producers complied to the
covenant. The power producers and the central government were not prepared to re-open
negotiations. A second item that was discussed was the over-performance of the installed
abatement equipment. In the covenant involved parties agreed on 85% abatement. Actual
abatement was 90-95 % (compare figure 7). The Sep wanted to run at 85% because that is a
bit cheaper. That is one way the Sep wanted to use the room that was created due to over-
compliance. The other way, and that was the third point of discussion, the Sep wanted to
use cheaper coal with a higher percentage of sulfur, also filling in over-compliance-room.
Although Sep formally proclaimed that this was not good, in practice, as our empirical
analysis suggests, it was practiced.
Besides the monitoring of the covenant, the air-emissions are also monitored by the
permitting authority. For larger power plants, such as electricity plants, this is a task for the
province.
Provinces held a low profile as agreed upon. The electricity plants are visited periodically.
The checks are not only related to air-emissions but to all aspect that are
(environmentally) regulated. It was recognized that it was unlikely that the electricity
plants would exceed the regulated emission standards as set in Bees. Simply because the
covenant is more ambitious and the Plan of action of The SEP kept the regulated emission
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limits into account. For malfunctions in the abatement equipment there is a settlement in
Bees.
Normal procedures are that when there are malfunctions in abatement equipment, the
company has to report this to the province. This certainly does not mean that we are
speaking about reinforcement at once. Under certain conditions the plant can produce for
72 hours when the emission standard is exceeded. If the malfunction is not repaired within
this time-limit other measures have to be taken, this could be fuel s switch or total switch
of. Because of the coordinating function of SEP this was no problem.
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3. Environmental effectiveness
3.1 Environmental effectiveness: the aggregate level of combustion plants
The basis for calculations in the Directive 88/609/EEC, the emissions of large combustion
plants in 1980 was estimated at 299 kilotons SO2, estimated by experts. Dutch ministry
claimed it to have been 325 kilotons in 1980.
Figure 4: SO2 emissions (kilotons/year) of large combustion plants
as reported to the European Union
1990 1991 1993 1994 1996
Refineries 49.5 50.8 44.4 41.6 31.8
Power plants* 43.7 37.5 22.1 14.6 18.7
Chemical industry** 9.1 8.2 8.7 9.5 5.8
Other industry*** 1.8 1.7 1.4 1.3 0.6
*): The Power plants as category is equivalent the EC category “Public power plants”
**): The Chemical industry as category is equivalent the EC category “Industrial plants”
***): The Other industry as category equals the EG category “Commercial plants” + “Other”
Indicators for environmental effectiveness, all large combustion plants:
Targeted Directive level (Y*) for 1993: 180 kilotons SO2
Targeted Directive level (Y*) for 2003: 120 kiloton SO2 (-60%)
Indicator 1: ^Y=Yf/Y* x 100 = 56.9/163.64 x 100 = 34.8
Y*1996=163.4 kilotons SO2 (1993: 180 kiloton, 2003 120 kiloton)
Yf= 56.9 ktons (1996)
Indicator 2: ^Y = (Y0-Yf)/Y0 = (104.1 – 56.9)/104.1 = 0.453
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3.2 Environmental effectiveness at the aggregate level of power plants
Next figure gives the emissions of SO2 from 1980-1989:
Figure 5: Kilotons SO2 emissions the (according to the SEP, Plan van aanpak 1991)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
196 210 148 94 72 64 66 64 65 41
The explanation for the small emissions in 1989 compared to 1990 is the low use of coal-
capacity, the availability of low-sulfur coal and almost no malfunctions in the abatement
equipment.
Figure 6 gives the developments in the period 1990-1996:
Figure 6: kilotons SO2 emissions (according to the SEP in four progress reports)
1990 1991 1993 1994 1996
Power plants* 43.7 37.5 22.1 14.6 18.7
In 1980 emissions of power plants were 196 tons SO2. In 1985 this was reduced to 64 tons
SO2. Targeted Directive level 1993 180 kiloton SO2 (-40%)
2003 120 kiloton SO2 (-60%)
Indicators for environmental effectiveness all large combustion plants:
Y*1996 = 106.9 kilotons (extrapolated on 1980 emissions of power plants)
Indicator 1: ^Y = Yf/Y* x 100 = 18.7/106.9 x 100 = 17.5
Y*1996= 106.9 kilotons SO2 (extrapolated, 1993: 117.6 kiloton, 2003 78.4 kiloton)
Indicator 2: ^Y = (Y0-Yf)/Y0 = (43.7 – 18.7)/43.7 = 0.57
3.3. Explanation of reduction established: dissentanglement
Disentanglement of decrease of 25 kilotons SO2 (1990 43.7 kilotons 1996 18.7 kilotons)
Factor 1: Closure of coal-fired plants without abatement technology (total capacity closed
985 MWe:
G12 4.673
VN 22/23 0.835
A 41 6.437
Adjustments in the Dutch electricity producing sector Kris Lulofs
Research Paper 2000-B-4 22
A 51 6.867
MC4 3.774
MC5 5.102
Total: 27.688 kilotons (-)
Factor 2: New coal-fired plants with abatement equipment (total new capacity 1200 Mwe):
HW8 2.712
A91 2.648
Total: 5.36 kilotons (+)
Factor 3: Fuel-substitution
The next figure illustrates the fuel substitution. In the Dutch emission inventory system
similar fuel types (fossil) are registered uniformly by expressing the different heat contents
in equivalent units (J).
Figure 7: Energy consumption in energy units (PJ/year)
1990 1991 1994 1996
Power plants 447 (100%) 444(100%) 418 (100%) 382(100%)
Solid 232 (52%) 202(45%) 197 (47%) 236 (62%)
Liquid 2 (0%) 1 (0%) 2 (0 %) 1.3 (0%)
Gaseous 214 (48%) 241 (54%) 220 (52 %) 145 (37.8)
Compared to 1990 the changes in fuel-inputs are marginal if we take relevance for SO2
emissions into the analysis. The use of coal is increased with about 4 PJ, the use of blast
combustion gas is down 1.2 PJ, the use of oil is down 0.7 PJ.
Without abatement equipment the extra coal means additional 2.43 kiloton SO2 emissions
(0.8% S in coal). Note: the extra used coal is not by definition fired in power plants without
abatement equipment. The only plant left in 1996 without abatement equipment is MC6
“Maascentrale 6”. This plant only produced 4.2 % of the electricity produced in coal-fired
plants. The other plants perform on average 92 % abatement. This means that the actual
increase because of the additional coal-input will be about 0.28 kiloton SO2 (normalized:
0.042 x 2.34 + 0.958 x 0.08 x 2.34).
Without abatement equipment the decreased use of blast combustion gas means 0.13 kiloton
SO2 (-).
Without abatement equipment the decreased use of oil means 0.34 kiloton SO2 (-). Figures
given by the gas/oil fired electricity plants that are reported individually in this case-report
add up to an increase of 0.1 kiloton which cannot be explained otherwise than by the S% of
the oil used or a small deviation in the input figures given. Because the importance of this is
minor, in the analysis the empirical numbers given by the plants could be used.
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Factor 4: changes in % S in coal
The actual % S in coal used was in 1990 0.7%. In 1996 it was 0.85%. This means of course
an additional emission of SO2 that can be estimated on 2.2 kiloton. This increase of %S was
market driven, an additional factor was that the transitional period for older power plants
ended 1994. So after an initial decrease of the average % S driven by regulation on older,
existing power plants, the sector could raise the %. For more information on this see
paragraph 5 on productive efficiency (figure 40).
Calculations above are based on: Emission without abatement 0.8 % S 608 g/GJ, Emission
without abatement 1.27 %S 967 g/GJ (Bakema en Kroon, 1988 p. 134) and found average
abatement level 92%. Estimation: (967- 608)/4.7 x 1.5 x 0.08= 9.16 g/GJ x 236 PJ
produced on coal = 2.2 kiloton).
Factor 5: malfunctions
In 1990 0.505 kiloton additional emissions because of malfunctions
In 1996 0.545 kiloton additional emissions because of malfunctions
So this means a marginal extra emission of 0.045 kiloton (+)
Factor 6: abatement
Figure 8 gives the % abatement (desulferication)
Figure 8: % desulferication (according to the SEP in four progress reports)
1990 1991 1994 1995 1996 1997
G-13 91.2 91.4 92.1 92.5 92.7 93.6
MV1 88 90.5 93.0 92.4 91.8 91.0
MV2 88 89.8 93.0 92.4 91.8 91.1
BS12 95.0 95.2 94.6 93.8 92.8 92.2
A-81 90.6 91.7 92.8 90.5 90.9 92.0
A91 92.9 91.5 92.1 91.3
HW 8 92.0 91.5 90.0 91.2
Quantitative:
On the basis of the emissions in 1996 on individual plant basis, and given developments in
the area of desulferication it can be assessed that the improvement of the abatement
equipment reduced the emission by 1.4 kiloton (-).
Qualitative:
Five electricity plants have a full abatement line in which SO2 is converted in gypsum. In
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a washing vat SO2 is contacted with lime. Calciumsulfiet is produced. This is oxidized into
calciumsulfiet. Insulation of washing towers/washing vat and replacement of rubber
upholstery was done in 1992 and 1993 at Maasvlakte 1 en 2, Gelderland 13, Amer 81 en
Borssele 12.
Total
Decrease of 25 kiloton
Factor 1: 27.7 kiloton (-)
Factor 2: 5.4 kiloton (+)
Factor 3: 0.28 kiloton (+)
0.34 kiloton (-)
Factor 4: 2.2 kiloton (+)
Factor 5: 0.045 kiloton (+) 
Factor 6: 1.4 kiloton (-)
Total 21.5 (-).
The difference 3.5 kilotons is unexplained
Zero based dissentanglement
Of course with the same factors the disentanglement can be done with an effort to explain
the total emission in 1990 and 1996:
1990
The estimate for the emissions in 1990 is 124 kiloton SO2 without abatement, based on
0.7% S in coal (calculation on fuel input basis without abatement, 0.8 % S in coal leading to
an emission of 608 gr/GJ). This can be cross-checked with figure 8 and emissions
individual power plants that are given in paragraph 3.4. Cross check on this basis leads to an
estimated emission of 131 kilotons). We use the 124 kilotons.
Depending on the source, real emissions were between 43.7 and 44.4 kiloton SO2. We
calculate with 44.4 kilotons
The actual average abatement level is 68.3 % (High percentage is achieved by low
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utilization of coal-fired plants without abatement equipment).
Malfunctions in abatement equipment causing about 0.5 kiloton additional SO2.
1996
In the status quo position emissions without abatement would of course have been again 124
kilotons.
Theoretically, emissions would have gone up to 125.7 kilotons, due to an increase of the
use of coal (factor 1.014). Cross check with figure 8 and emissions of individual power
plants, leads to an emission of 153 kilotons. The explanation of the large misfit is simple,
this is not a valid cross check because of the increased average %S in coal compared to
1990.
The average % of S in coal is up, this would lead theoretically to an additional emission of
26.9 kilotons, leading to a total of 0.214 x 125.7 = 152.6 kilotons. Now the crosscheck is
valid: If we crosscheck with figure 8 and emissions individual power plants. Crosscheck on
this basis leads to an emission of 153 kilotons, a marginal misfit.
Level of abatement rose from 64.2 % to 89 % (including plant “MC6" which has no
abatement line). This leads to an emission of 0.11 x 152.6 kilotons = 16.8 kilotons.
Adding the malfunctions is about 0.5 kiloton, leading to an emission of 17.3 kiloton
Some sources mention a total emission of 18.7, leaving 1.4 kiloton unexplained.
On 88/609/EEC as a causal factor
The experts at the ministry for Housing, Physical Planning and Environmental Affairs
reject the suggestion that the covenant was caused by 88/609/EEC. It was a logical step in
the implementation of the acidification policy. The alternative was to harden the national
legislation far beyond the requested levels by 88/609/EEC. That the covenant in fact can be
used as the instrument with which the Dutch government are complying with their
obligations for emission reduction targets and plans is seen a just comfortable coincidence.
3.4 Environmental effectiveness at the plant level.
The covenant covered 83 production units. A lot of them are only fired by natural gas and
therefor not emitting SO2. Basically there are three kinds of power plants that emit SO2 of
which only two kinds are important for key-analysis. These are power plants that are fired
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with coal or blast furnace gas. The third kind of electricity plant that emits SO2 are the
power plants that normally are fired on natural gas but sometimes are fired on oil. Mostly
this is done on very cold days to relief the gas supply. The emissions involved are minor on
only relevant to complete the analysis in a formal way. The simple reason for this is that
these emissions are very small and very little attention is given to these sources of SO2
emissions, these power plants are preferably fired with natural gas.
There are four corporations in the Netherlands: EPON, UNA, EZH and EPZ. The core of
analysis will be on the coal-fired plants and the blast furnace plants. Some secondary
attention will be paid to the influence on SO2 emissions of gas-fired plants that on extreme
cold days sometimes are being oil fired. For the overview emissions are relevant of these
plants, nevertheless because in these plants are not transformed for their SO2 emissions
limited analysis is done on them.
3.4.1 Electricity producer EPON
* Total SO2 emissions of EPON-plants:
Figure 9: Total emissions SO2 from EPON (tons)
1989 1990 1993 1994 1996
Total EPON 7477 6817 2852 2091 2249
Coal fired plants 7100 6657 2725 2037 2188
Gas/oil fired plants 377 162 127 54 61
* SO2 emissions of coal fired EPON-plants:
G 12 “Gelderland 12” , brought into use 1963, can also be fired with oil, capacity 115 Mwe
Figure 10: Total emissions SO2 from EPON plant G12 “Gelderland 12”(tons)
1989 1990 1993 1994 1996
G-12
Fuel: coal
5700 4673 Closed Closed Closed
% S in coal 0.67 - - -
Electricity produced - - - - -
G 13 “Gelderland 13” , brought into use 1981, can also be fired with oil, capacity 602 Mwe
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Figure 11: Total emissions SO2 from EPON plant G13 “Gelderland 13”(tons)
1989 1990 1993 1994 1996
G-13
Coal
1400 1984 2752 2037 2188
% S in coal - 0.66% 0.52% 0.56% 0.87%
Electricity produced - - 3536GWh 2970GWh 3192GWh
* Emissions of gas/oil fired EPON-plants:
Figure 12: Total emissions SO2 from EPON plants that are gas/oil fired (tons)
1989 1990 1993 1994 1996
HC50
Gas/oil
25 - - 12
FL-1
Gas/oil
350 42 20 6 -
Fl-2
Gas/oil
- 2 14 -
Fl30
Gas/oil
114 93 48 38
BCGI
Oil/gas
2 2 - -
HC60
Gas/olie
- - - - 11
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3.4.2 Electricity producer UNA
* Total SO2 emissions of UNA-plants:
Figure 13: Total emissions SO2 from UNA (tons)
1989 1990 1993 1994 1996
Total UNA 1647 1849 1125 4514 3309
Coal fired plants - - 74 1291 2712
Blast furnace gas fired 1543 1739 839 3129 575
Gas/oil fired plants 104 110 212 94 22
* SO2 emissions of coal fired UNA-plants:
HW 8 “Hemweg” , brought into use 1994, can also be fired with oil, capacity 600 Mwe
Figure 14: Total emissions SO2 from UNA plantHW8 “ Hemweg 8”(tons)
1989 1990 1993 1994 1996
HW 8
Coal/gas
New New 74 1291 2712
% S in coal 0.73 % <1 %S
Electricity produced 727 GWh 3376GWh 3827GWh
* SO2 emissions of blast Funace Gas fired UNA-plants:
VN22 and 23 “Velsen 22 and23” , brought into use about 1966, can also be fired with oil,
capacity about 127 Mwe
Figure 15: Total emissions SO2 from UNA plants VN22 and 23 “Velsen 22 and23” (tons)
1989 1990 1993 1994 1996
VN 22/23
Blast furnace gas/ oil
- 835 Closed closed Closed
VN24 “Velsen 24” , brought into use 1974, can also be fired with natural gas and oil,
capacity about 459 Mwe
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Figure 16: Total emissions SO2 from UNA plants VN24 “Velsen 24” (tons)
1989 1990 1993 1994 1996
VN 24
Blast furnace gas/gas/oil
522 660 262 611 93
% S
Electricity produced - -- 1893GWh 1668GWh 1467GWh
VN25 “Velsen 25”, brought into use 1986, can also be fired with natural gas and oil,
capacity about 361 Mwe
Figure 17: Total emissions SO2 from UNA plant VN25 “Velsen 25” (tons)
1989 1990 1993 1994 1996
VN 25 Blast furnace
gas/gas/oil
1021 244 577 2518 482
% S
Electricity produced 2469GWh 2826GWh 2844GWh
* Emissions of gas/oil fired UNA-plants:
Figure 18: Total emissions SO2 from UNA plants that are gas/oil fired (tons)
1989 1990 1993 1994 1996
HW5 gas/oil 9 5 Closed closed Closed
HW6 gas/oil 14 8 11 closed Closed
HW 7 gas/oil 56 - 54 - 17
DM31 gas/oil - 28 31 12 Closed
DM32 gas/oil - 26 88 73 Closed
LW5 gas/oil 25 43 28 9 5
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3.4.3 Electricity producer EZH
* Total SO2 emissions of EZH-plants:
Figure 19: Total emissions SO2 from EZH (tons)
1989 1990 1993 1994 1996
Total EZH 3700 3742 2004 2042 3114
Coal fired plants 3540 3710 1988 1806 3043
Gas/oil fired plants 160 32 16 236 71
* SO2 emissions of coal fired EZH-plants:
MV1 “Rotterdam MV1”, brought into use 1988, can also be fired with oil, capacity 518
Mwe
Figure 20: Total emissions SO2 from EZH plant MV1 “Rotterdam MV1”, (tons)
1989 1990 1993 1994 1996
MV-1 coal/gas 1700 1640 1107 881 1532
%S in coal 0.55% 0.55% 0.50% 0.76%
Electricity Produced 3918GWh 3636GWh 3410GWh
MV2 “Rotterdam MV2”, brought into use 1987, can also be fired with oil, capacity 518
Mwe
Figure 21: Total emissions SO2 from EZH plant MV2 “Rotterdam MV2”, (tons)
1989 1990 1993 1994 1996
MV-2 coal/gas 1840 2070 881 925 1511
%S in coal 0.55 % S 0.55%S 0.50 % S 0.76%S
Electricity Produced 3415GWh 3630GWh 3406GWh
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* SO2 emissions of gas/oil fired EZH-plants:
Figure 22: Total emissions SO2 from EZH plants that are gas/oil fired (tons)
1989 1990 1993 1994 1996
FW 4 gas/oil 69 30 - 117 14
FW 5 gas/oil 79 - - 117 46
CM 3 7 - -
CM 4 5 - -
DO-6 gas/oil - 2 16 2 11
3.4.4 Electricity producer EPZ
* Total SO2 emissions of EPZ-plants:
Figure 23: Total emissions SO2 from EPZ (tons)
1989 1990 1993 1994 1996
Total EPZ 28430 32407 16072 9199 10021
Coal fired plants 28303 32305 16072 9199 9554
Gas/oil fired plants 127 102 - - 367
* SO2 emissions of coal fired EPZ-plants:
BS 12 “Borssele 12”, brought into use 1987, can also be fired with gas, capacity 403 Mwe
Figure 24: Total emissions SO2 from plant BS 12 “Borssele 12” (tons)
1989 1990 1993 1994 1996
BS 12 coal/gas 1015 781 410 850 1263
%S in coal 0.75 % 0.48 % 0.66% 0.78%S
Electricity Produced 1634GWh 2716GWh 2584GWh
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A-41 “Amer 41 , brought into use 1965, can also be fired with gas, capacity 223 Mwe
Figure 25: Total emissions SO2 from plant A-41 “Amer 41” (tons)
1989 1990 1993 1994 1996
A-41 7012 6437 4519 closed Closed
%S in coal 0.81 % 0.79% closed Closed
Electricity
Produced
1008GWh
A-51 “Amer 51, brought into use 1966, can also be fired with gas, capacity 223 Mwe
Figure 26: Total emissions SO2 from plant A-51 “Amer 51” (tons)
1989 1990 1993 1994 1996
A-51 5942 6867 4461 closed Closed
% S in coal 0.81 % 0.71%
Electricity produced 988GWh
A-81 “Amer 81”, brought into use 1980, can also be fired with oil, capacity 645 Mwe
Figure 27: Total emissions SO2 from plant A-81 “Amer 81” (tons)
1989 1990 1993 1994 1996
A-81
Coal/oil
3623 2525 1728 1559 1771
%S in coal 0.73% 0.53% 0.65% 0.94%
Electricity produced 4157GWh 3387GWh 2449GWh
MC-4 “Bruggenum 4 , brought into use 1961, can also be fired with oil, capacity 120 Mwe
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Figure 28: Total emissions SO2 from plant MC-4 “Bruggenum 4 ” (tons)
1989 1990 1993 1994 1996
MC-4 2932 3774 Closed closed Closed
% S in coal 0.77%
MC-5 “Bruggenum 5, brought into use 1966, can also be fired with gas, capacity 177 Mwe
Figure 29: Total emissions SO2 from plant MC-5 “Bruggenum 5” (tons)
1989 1990 1993 1994 1996
MC-5 4187 5102 Closed closed Closed
% S in coal 0.77%
MC-6 “Bruggenum 6 , brought into use 1986, can also be fired with gas, capacity 233 Mwe
Figure 30: Total emissions SO2 from plant MC-6 “Bruggenum 6” (tons)
1989 1990 1993 1994 1996
MC-6 coal/gas 3592 6819 4439 5514 3972
%S in coal 0.77% 0.70% 0.58% 0.62%
Electricity produced 1079GWh 1336GWh 1033GWh
A-91”Amer 91”, brought into use 1993 can also be fired with gas capacity 600 Mwe
Figure 31: Total emissions SO2 from plant A-91”Amer 91” (tons)
1989 1990 1993 1994 1996
A-91 coal/gas 515 1276 2648
%S in coal 0.53% 0.63% 0.95%
Electricity produced 2036GWh 3812GWh 4165GWh
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* SO2 emissions of gas/oil fired EZH-plants:
Figure 32: Total emissions SO2 from EZH plants that are gas/oil fired (tons)
1989 1990 1993 1994 1996
CCA gas/oil 27 6 - 13
CCB gas/oil 100 96 - 354
A 61 gas/oil - - - - -
A 71 Gas/oil - - - - -
3.5. Some conclusions on environmental effectiveness
Time series on SO2 emissions of power plants indicate two moments in which tendencies
shifted. After a rapid decrease in the years 1980 until 1984, emissions were relatively stable
between 1984 and 1989. In 1989 an exceptional small use of coal capacity runs in front of
the start of a new period of decrease between 1989 and 1996. In the period 1990-1996 the
prime explanation is not a small use of coal as fuel but the use of low-sulfur coal,
improvements on abatement equipment, the close down of old coal fired plants without
abatement equipment and the construction of two new coal fired plants with abatement
equipment. The use of different types of fuel and also the available coal fired capacity has
not changed substantially. On the aggregate level of the power plants the qualitative
analysis made clear that the European Directive 88/609 is not  linked to the established
reductions in emissions.
The conclusion that the total reduction in SO2 emissions is causally linked to the covenant
is tempting. There are however some considerations that should be taken into account
before making such a statement. First the covenant was agreed upon in a period of growing
political and public awareness of environmental damage in the late eighties. The
acidification policy and stricter regulation and the threat of even stricter regulation are
important explanatory factors. The threat to the electricity producers that they had to face
stricter emission limits in the years to come is a key driver that made the covenant
possible. This created the setting in which a voluntary agreement was within reach under the
condition that no additional regulation would be issued during the period of the covenant.
If the covenant were not agreed upon, the regulation would have become stricter. The
statement that the same environmental goals would have been reached by this alternative
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regulation approach can only be presented with some caution. Nevertheless provinces think
that it would not have been unthinkable that even stricter emission limits could have been
possible.
Still the decrease of SO2 emissions is due to measures that the electricity-producing sector
imposed on itself. Still, existing regulation was certainly not put out of order. When we look
therefor at the closing down of the old coal fired plants we have to keep in mind that these
are really old plants at the end of their life span. When we look at the two new large coal
fired plants we have to keep in mind that existing regulation required abatement technology
abating at least 85% and also limited the emission of SO2 /m3. This results in a constraint
on the % sulfur in coal to be fueled in these new plants.
The general conclusion is that there are no reasons to deny that the covenant was the
prime driver for changes made, still existing regulation and the avoidance of the alternative
instrument are important factors to keep in mind when analyzing the changes made. Finally
SO2 emissions could have been even less when the new coal-fired plants would not have
been built. The energy-policy on fuel differentiation and the strategy of Sep to secure cheap
fuels explain the building of these new plants. The additional SO2 emissions created no
problems, for the Nox emissions it made no substantial difference.
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4. Allocative efficieny
4.1. Abatement patterns
In the IMPOL project the individual abatement pattern is given by the fraction of the
initial emission (^Y) that has been abated. The initial emission Y0 in this case study is
expresses as tons in 1990, Yf is the emission in tons in 1996. So the indicator and the
outcomes on the individual plants are:
Indicator: ^Y = (Y0-Yf)/Y0 on plant level:
G 12 “Gelderland 12” (5700 – 0)/5700 = 1
G13 “Gelderland 13” (1984 – 2188)/1984 = -0.10
HW 8 “Hemweg” (0 – 2712)/0 = -
VN 23 “Velsen 23”= (835-0)/835 = 1
VN 24 “”Velsen 24” = (660-93)/660 = 0.86
VN 25 “Velsen 25” = (244-482)/244 = -0.96
MV-1 “Rotterdam MV-1” = (1640 –1532)/1640 = 0.06
MV2 “Rotterdam MV-2” = (2070 – 1511)/2070 = 0.27
BS 12 “Borssele 12” = (783 – 1263)/783 = -0.61
A41 “Amer 41” = (6437 – 0)/6437 = 1
A 51 “Amer 51” = (6867 - 0)/6867 = 1
A-81 “Amer 81” = (2525 – 1771)/2525 = 0.30
MC-4 “Bruggenum 4” = (3774 – 0)/3774 = 1
MC-5 “Bruggenum 5” = (5102 – 0)/5102 = 1
MC-6 “Bruggenum 6” = (6819 – 3972)/6819 = 0.41
A 91 “Amer 91” = (0 – 2648)/0 = -
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4.2. Cost allocation by the Sep
The large gain for the Sep and the electricity producers was the flexibility that was in the
covenant. No additional regulation on the level of the individual plants was issued and the
goals were formulated on the aggregate level. This left of course space to study on the most
cost-effective solutions to implement the covenant. For SO2 this was reasonable well
known during the negotiations on the covenant, for Nox there was more uncertainty on
technology and costs. Starting point for the Sep was cost-effectiveness when they
developed the plan of action, as they were obliged to by the covenant. They used their
normal operating and counting program. All power plants are in and the program is used for
balancing the cost-prizes of electricity producers. This is necessary of course in a system in
the Sep decided when every individual plant has to be switched on or switched of. On the
basis of a scenario until the year 2000, the necessary abatement was known. The four
electricity-producing companies indicated what they could do to decrease emissions. After a
first shake out, detailed costs estimates were made. The openness of the process was
enormous according to the respondents from the Sep. A crucial factor in this was of course
the existence of the cost pooling mechanism1.
Still we have to keep in mind that the Sep could not prepare the measures in total freedom.
The fact that the covenant included no additional stricter regulation, this does not mean
that existing regulation was not valid. The constraints from existing regulation are discussed
in the paragraph on productive efficiency.
The old coal fired plants that were closed really were on the end of their life span, this
makes cost calculations difficult. The use of low-sulfur coals increased the fuel costs. In
practice the electricity sector did not lower the average sulfur % in coal substantially and
even tried to raise the sulfur % at some moments. There is however regulation that give an
upper level of S in coal. The electricity producers did not try to raise these legal limits. The
updating of abatement technology and abatement technology at the new plants were of
course costly measures. More about the costs is explained in the next paragraph.
                                                
1 The Covenant concerning the reduction of SO2 and Nox emissions, Ellis Brand, Enschede, June 1999
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4.3 Cost characteristics of individual sources
The cost characteristics of individual sources are expressed by indirect indicators and by
direct indicators (Eames, 1999).
Indirect indicators
Figure 33 gives the required indirect indicators and the Y0 level of abatement by end-of pipe
technology.
Figure 33: Indirect indicators on relevant power plants
Power plant Year of Installment Capacity Mwe Y0 (tons) Y0 level of abatement
G 12 “Gelderland 12” 1963 115 5700 ~0
G13 “Gelderland 13” 1981 602 1984 91.2 %
HW 8 “Hemweg” 1994 600 - -
VN 22/23 “Velsen 23” 1966 127 835 ~0 bcg
VN 24 “”Velsen 24” 1974 459 660 ~0 bcg
VN 25 “Velsen 25” 1986 361 244 ~0 bcg
MV-1 “Rotterdam MV-1” 1988 518 1640 88 %
MV2 “Rotterdam MV-2” 1987 518 2070 88 %
BS 12 “Borssele 12” 1987 403 783 95.0 %
A41 “Amer 41” 1965 223 6437 ~0
A 51 “Amer 51” 1966 223 6867 ~0
A-81 “Amer 81” 1980 645 2525 90.6 %
MC-4 “Bruggenum 4” 1961 120 3774 ~0
MC-5 “Bruggenum 5” 1966 177 5102 ~0
MC-6 “Bruggenum 6” 1986 223 6819 ~0
A 91 “Amer 91” 1993 600 - -
bcg = blast combustion gas
In the figure 33 the Y0 level of abatement is in between direct and indirect. The reason is
that technology applied for SO2 is quite homogeneous in the Netherlands.
The direct indicators
An important part of the deal in the covenant is that the regulation as it is introduced in
1987 by the Bees (Staatsblad, 1987) is the position of existing plants. By the Bees 1987 it
was determined that new power plant had to meet the emission limit of 400 mg/m3 and full
combustion gas abatement equipment. Existing plants that were closed down before 1995
only were forced to use low-sulfur fuels (maximum 0.8% S). In the covenant in 1991the
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deal was made to reduce SO2 emissions substantially and on the other hand not to
strengthen regulation on existing plants. For MC6 “Bruggenum 6” this meant a special
status.
Basically there are three strategies applied in the Netherlands to reduce emissions of SO2:
1. Closure of plants
2. Substitution of high sulfur coal for low sulfur coal
3. Abatement equipment
1. On the closure of plants
The closure of power plants can hardly be evaluated in economic terms. An important part
of the deal in the covenant is that the regulation as it is introduced in 1987 by the Bees
(Staatsblad, 1987) is the position of existing plants. By the Bees 1987 it was determined
that new power plant had to meet the emission limit of 400 mg/m3 and full combustion gas
abatement equipment. Existing plants that were closed down before 1995 only were forced
to use low-sulfur fuels (maximum 0.8% S). In the covenant in 1991the deal was made to
reduce SO2 emissions substantially and on the other hand not to strengthen regulation on
existing plants. For MC6 “Bruggenum 6” that was planned to be closed in 1999/2000 this
means a special status, finally it was closed already in 1997. The closed power plants were
built between 1961 and 1966.
2. On lower sulfur coals
The marginal costs of these kinds of abatement measures raises from high-sulfur coal to
low-sulfur coal. The price difference between 3.5%S and 0.5 % S was 9%.
In 1989 prices:
Prices of coal prices 1989 (source Wiersma, 1989, p: 84):
3.5% S: 206.05 Dutch guilders/ton
2.9% S: 207.63 Dutch guilders/ton
2.3% S: 210.26 Dutch guilders/ton
1.7% S: 213.94 Dutch guilders/ton
1.1% S: 218.68 Dutch guilders/ton
0.5% S: 224.61 Dutch guilders/ton
Energy input for Dutch coals was on average 6500 kcal/kg that equals 27083.33 kJ/kg.
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3. On abatement equipment
There are dry and wet systems. The difference is in the substance that is used for
absorption. Dry systems use a solid substance at high temperature. Advantage is that there is
no need for re-heating the combustion gasses. That saves energy. But there are wastes to
take care of. Basically there were three kind of processes considered in the Netherlands:
1. The “throw away process” technically her operational as the “lime-sludge” process.
After use the absorption material lime cannot be re-used and has to be dumped which of
course costs money. This process is used a lot in the United States because of low dumping
prices.
2. The “gypsum producing process” technically her operational as the “gypsum/acid”
process. This process has as side-product gypsum that can be used in the constructing sector.
This lowers costs. But it is a wet system in which temperature of combustion gasses goes
down to bout 60 0C, so re-heating is necessary. This is the only process used in the
Netherlands in the sector of power plants.
3. The “regenerating process” in which the absorption material can be re-used. In the
Netherlands only the “gypsum/acid” process is used. This was chosen on the basis of
information on cost-effectiveness and problems connected to the three processes. There
are two major sources of information on the costs of the installed abatement equipment in
the Netherlands. They partly are not in line, but there are acceptable explanations for this.
We get into that after presenting the facts:
First comprehensive study on abatement cost done by Wiersma
In the next table are the investment-costs of the three processes compared for several
capacities (note: prices of 1984, source: Wiersma 1989):
Figure 34: Investments costs (million guilders 1984)
150Mwe 300Mwe 450Mwe 600Mwe
Lime-sludge 20.4 39.7 58.1 71.3
Gypsum 22.4 47.8 71.3 89.6
Regenerative 40.7 73.3 103.9 119.2
Note: this figures are given for new plants. Existing plants require a 30 % larger Investment
according to Wiersma. The table shows that there are some economies of scale in
investment costs.
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Next table gives the variable costs estimation for a 600 MWe plant that is used 6000 hours
a year (68% used). Energetic return 40% (meaning 2150 Kcal/Kwh). Of course the variable
costs predominantly depends on the % S in fuel used (Wiersma 1988).
Figure 35: Variable costs (million guilders 1984)
0.5 % S 1.5 % S 2.5 % S 3.5 %S
Lime-sludge 6.07 18.21 30.36 42.5
Gypsum 1.03 3.09 5.15 7.21
Regenerative 2.07 6.21 10.35 14.49
When these key-estimates were used to estimate the yearly abatement costs it proved that
the in the Netherlands used “gypsum/acid” wet process, the yearly abatement costs rise
when low sulfur coal is used, the explanation for that is given later.
The next table gives the yearly costs for abatement equipment only, for several capacities
(write of annuity, 25 years interest rate 4%, plant used 6000 hours a year -68% used-,
Energetic return 40% (meaning 2150 Kcal/Kwh).
Figure 36: Total yearly costs (million guilders 1984)
3.5 % S 2.5 % S 1.5 % S 0.5 %S
150Mwe 28 18 11 8
300Mwe 32 23 17 15
450Mwe 36 28 22 20
600Mwe 40 32 27 26
For the other two processes the same estimates are available. Remarkable outcome is that in
these processes it pays to use medium-sulfur coals instead of high sulfur coals (Wiersma,
1989).
Second comprehensive study done by Bakema en Kroon
The second source of knowledge on costs is a study by Bakema en Kroon that was done for
the Dutch National Exploration, a plan from the Ministry of Economic Affairs. Their
estimates on prices were for the year 1985/1986. They tend to calculate with a bit shorter
write-off periods, which is for abatement equipment better. Combined with the estimates of
Wiersma the following numbers on the gypsum/acid process are perceived as more adequate:
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Figure 37: Investments costs (million guilders 1985)
150Mwe 300Mwe 450Mwe 600Mwe
Gypsum process, new plant (85% abatement) 24 52 77 97
Gypsum process, existing plant (85% abatement) 31 68 100 126
Gypsum process, new plant (95% abatement) 32 69 102 129
Gypsum process existing plant (95% abatement) 41 90 133 168
Also on the issue of the variable costs they make some adjustments. Most important they
assume that to get rid of the gypsum, payments have to be made. This is a debatable
assumption. Checking this contradiction learned that the gypsum is sold to the constructing
sector, so the figures given are compensated for that (gypsum is sold, fl 40/ton).
Not debatable are the assumption on staff, that are in line with that of Wiersma and their
substantial assumption on the maintenance costs (7% of the investment). Combined with
the estimates of Wiersma the following numbers on the acid/gypsum process are probably
more adequate, being of course the % S a relevant variable:
Figure 38: Variable costs, based on 1.27 % S-coal, plant 600 Mwe, used 6000 hours a year -
68% used-, Energetic return 40% (meaning 2150 Kcal/Kwh).
150Mwe 300Mwe 450MWe 600Mwe
New plant (85% abatement) 3.9 7.8 11.6 15.5
Existing plant (85% abatement) 4.4 8.8 13.1 17.5
New plant (95% abatement) 4.6 9.3 13.9 18.5
Existing plant (95% abatement) 5.3 10.6 15.9 21.2
Because the actual capacity, production of electricity and %S in coal is known, the costs
that are made can be estimated. Only “MC6” was operated on low sulfur coal without
abatement equipment. The other power plants have different capacities, the quantities of
electricity produced are different, the % Sulfur show some variation amounts. The capacity
of the plant, the electricity produced and the % S in coal seem to be the factors that
determine the costs.
Some final estimates on costs
The % S in coal has some serious impacts on costs. The differences/changes as presented
don't seem to be that large at first sight. A closer look makes it clear why the electricity
sector opened the discussion in an effort to enable them to use the emission space due to
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over-compliance, by raising the average %S in coal. The input of coal was in 1996 236 PJ.
Based on the emission of SO2 without abatement, the average abatement in 1996, and the
estimated price difference, it can be calculated that the increase of % S in coal from 0.7 in
1990 to 0.85 in 1996 saved the electricity sector about 30.000.000 guilders in 1996. The
additional emissions caused can be calculated on the basis of the average abatement. The
estimate is 2.2 kton. The cost saving for each ton additional SO2 emitted is therefor about
13600 Dutch guilders (prices 1988). This calculation is under the assumption that
abatement is 92 %. If there is no abatement equipment installed, the saving is only 1088
Dutch guilders for every additional ton SO2.
The costs for abatement equipment installed can also be estimated on the basis of the study
of Wiersma (1984):
Assumptions: A 600 Mwe power plant, that is used 68% (5256 use on full power basis), has
an abatement percentage of 92%, fuel is coal that contains 0.85%S.
The estimated emission of SO2 for this plant without abatement is 26357 tons SO2, with
abatement it is 2108 tons. The costs made for abatement are then calculated at 922 Dutch
guilders/tons. This is close to the 1000 guilders for each ton that has been calculated by
Bakema en Kroon (1988) on the basis of 85% abatement. On the basis of 95% abatement,
they calculate 1050 Dutch guilders for every ton (Bakema en Kroon, 1988, p 36).
We are now able to estimate the costs related to abatement equipment in six plants.
We have knowledge on the amounts of electricity produced, the installed capacity, the use
of capacity, the % S in coal and the abatement %. The abated tons SO2 and the costs can be
calculated. In figure 39 the costs are given as total costs for the year 1996 and as costs for
each ton SO2 that is abated by the plant. There are two versions given (I and II). Version I
is based on figure 36, variety on capacity and on the percentage S in coal is taken into
account. Taking variance in variable costs into account is not very useful, the differences
are small, compare figure 35. The second version takes differences in variable costs due to
the use of the plant and the variance in %S in coal into account, the estimates for variable
costs are made on the basis of figure 37. The difference between "existing" and "new" has
not been taking into account.
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Figure 39: Estimated abatement costs of six electricity plants
Plant/capacity GWh
electricity 1996
Use Of
capacity %
% S in coal Emission no
abatement
Gram/GJ
Abatement
percentage
Abated tons
SO2 in 1996
Estima-ted
total costs in
1996 I/II
(Millions
Dutch
guilders)
Estima-ted
abatement
costs/ton SO2
(Dutch
guilders)
G 13 602 Mwe 3192 60.5 0.87 661 93.6 31999 26.4/34.7 825/1084
MV 1 518 Mwe 3410 75.7 0.76 578 91.0 23416 22.5/29.6 960/1264
MV 2 518 Mwe 3406 75.6 0.76 578 91.1 23410 22.5/29.6 961/1264
BS 18 403
Mwe
2584 71.0 0.78 593 92.2 22829 18.7/24.6 1053/ 1385
A 81 645 Mwe 2449 43.4 0.94 714 92 20876 26.5/32.5 1269/1557
A 91 600 Mwe 4165 79.0 0.95 722 91.3 35473 26.2/38.8 739/1093
As shown by figure 39, a smaller plant like BS 18 may have smaller absolute abatement
costs, the costs for each ton SO2 abated are relatively higher. The same is true for the
intermediate plants MV1 and MV2. Plant A 81 shows that the capital costs for abatement
equipment have large influences. When the use of the plant is low, abatement costs for each
ton SO2 abated, raise strongly. For the interpretation of the absolute numbers, one has to
take into account that these are 1984/1985 prices.
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5. Productive efficiency
88/609/EEC did impose one additional restraint: For new coal-fuelled combustion plants,
that were permitted before August 1th, 1988 the emission standard for NOx was lowered
from 800 to 650 mg/m3 combustion gas. No technology was prescribed. The fact that large
now is defined by the EU Directive as > 50 MW, and existing Dutch legislation defined it as
>75 MW is irrelevant for the power plants.
In detail requirements on solid fuels and SO2 are as follows:
 Figure 40: Requirements from Bees, the 200 mg demand is implemented by a renewal of
Bees in 1992, before this date, the limit was 400. Some limits were made stricter at that time
and the settlement between the government and SEP in the covenant was integrated in Bees
Permit before 29/5/87 Permit between 29/5/87 and
1/1/90
Permit on or after 1/190
> 300 MW and still in use after
1994
Max. 400 mg SO2 /m3 + 85%
desulfurication of combustion
gasses , starting 1 december 1989
Max. 400 mg SO2 /m3 + 85%
desulfurication of combustion
gasses
Max. 200 mg SO2 /m3 + 85%
desulfurication of combustion
gasses
> 300 MW and not in use after 1994 Max. 0.8 % S in coals, starting
1/6/87 (coals 26 MJ/kg)
Max. 400 mg SO2 /m3 + 85%
desulfurication of combustion
gasses
Max. 200 mg SO2 /m3 + 85%
desulfurication of combustion
gasses
< 300 MW Max. 0.8 % S in coals, starting
1/6/87 (coals 26 MJ/kg)
Max. 700 mg SO2 /m3 Max. 700 mg SO2 /m3
Therefore it is obvious that 88/609/EEC did not put new constraints on the power plants as
far as SO2 is at stake. The Air Pollution Act (WLV) and the AMvB Bees 1987/1991 that
indeed do impose constraints, open the possibility for permitting authorities to lower the
maximum 1.2% S in coal. This limit % S in coal in regulated in the AMvB Sulfur-percentage
Fuels that first came into use in 1974 and was changed several times. In principle provinces
could go as low as 0.3 in their permits. But when the covenant was negotiated the outcome
was that provinces were not gonna issue any additional demands as long as the electricity
sector performed to a level as was agreed upon.
Still a closer look at the regulation makes clear that with the coal-fired electricity grid the
degrees of freedom were not that large. The Plan of action drawn up by the Sep had to take
into consideration the constraints from existing regulation. The covenant did impose
additional constraints on the sector as a whole, not on individual plants. Still existing
regulation as mentioned imposed constraints on individual power plants.
Adjustments in the Dutch electricity producing sector Kris Lulofs
Research Paper 2000-B-4 46
Of course the expected pattern can be observed. The only power plant without abatement-
equipment MC6 “Maascentrale” was fired by low sulfur coal in 1996. The others were fired
in 1996 on coal with a higher % S in combining this with a wet washer that performed at
least 85% abatement (compare figure 36). In 1996 the % S in coal was in average 0.85%
The trend to perform more than the required 85% abatement can be understood in the
system of cost-price compensation that was applied within the sector and coordinated by
the SEP. Recently the energy market liberalized. The experts observe that the power plants
nowadays try to fill the allowed level of emission, trying to lower costs. They tried it before
while implementing the covenant, pressure form the government prevented it from being
applied at large scale, still in the year 1996 the average % S in coal was high compared to
previous years. The upper level of S in coal allowed is 1.2%.
On informative events the knowledge of the threat of stricter was important as a driver.
For the implementation of the covenant the knowledge/information of SEP in the
coordinated structure was important. Starting point for the Sep was cost-effectiveness when
they developed the plan of action, as they were obliged to by the covenant. They used their
normal operating and counting program. All power plants are in and the program is used for
balancing the cost-prizes of electricity producers. This is necessary of course in a system in
the Sep decided when every individual plant has to be switched on or switched of. On the
basis of a scenario until the year 2000, the necessary abatement was known. The four
electricity-producing companies indicated what they could do to decrease emissions. After a
first shake out, detailed costs estimates were made. The openness of the process was
enormous according to the respondents from the Sep. A crucial factor in this was of course
the existence of the cost pooling mechanism2.
Still we have to keep in mind that the Sep could not prepare the measures in total freedom.
The fact that the covenant included no additional stricter regulation, this does not mean
that existing regulation was not valid. The constraints from existing regulation are discussed
in the paragraph on productive efficiency.
                                                
2 The Covenant concerning the reduction of SO2 and Nox emissions, Ellis Brand, Enschede, June 1999.
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6. Administrative cost
6.1. Goverments
At the Ministry of Housing, Physical Planning and Environmental Affairs, two full-time
staff-members are employed with the regulation, implementation and monitoring of Large
Combustion Plants. This includes the covenant and the monitoring of the covenant. A
reasonable estimate would be that about 25 % is spend on power plants being 0.5 full-time
staff member.
In every of the twelve provinces one full time staff-member is employed with the
regulation, implementation and monitoring of Large Combustion Plants (12 x 1). Off
course more than 12 people can be involved. A reasonable estimate would be that about 25
% of this time is spend on power plants. One should however takes into account that a lot
of this time is spend on other issues than just the emissions of SO2 and Nox. The work
comprehends the whole permit of the electricity plant and deals with quite a number of
aspects like noise, vibrations, smell, transportation, waste-water in the sewer.
This estimate can be cross-checked by some available estimates for these kind of plants.
Benchmarks are that an "integral permit" takes 112 hours work, an integral
monitoring/enforcement effort takes 39 hours, taking care of a complaint takes 5 hours
(VNG, 1995). An "Integral permit" comprehends as mentioned before, a lot more than just
air-emissions. The permit will be readjusted but normally has a life span of about 10 years.
The frequency of monitoring and enforcement efforts is normally in between the range
from twice a year to once every two years. The lower limit is in this estimate 30.7 hours,
the upper limit 89.2 hours.
A full work year is about 1800 hours, there are about 100 power units, so on central level
about 9 hours are spend on every power plant and on the level of provinces about 54 hours
(second estimate: 30.7 - 89.2 hours) are spend on every power plant. The effort for only
SO2 emissions is a lot smaller.
6.2. Power plants
The SEP is not able to estimate the time spend on the covenant and the four progress
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reports. Also the drawing of the Plan of action cannot be estimated in hours. The reason is
that these tasks were performed in the context of operational/coordinating management
over the electricity sector.
In the sector estimates of the administrative costs involved deal with this as being variable
costs. For a plant with a capacity of 600 Mwe, for every hour of production 0.54 hour of
indirect administrative costs are calculated. For a 600 Mwe plant that is used for 6000 hours
this will mean about 3240 hours. In total this would lead to about 21000 man-hours for all
coal fired plants together, if they were used for the 68% of the time Still these are very
rough estimates that could include some of the technical management of the abatement
equipment. Registration of emissions of SO2 usually was done by the power plants. Either
by continuos measurement or by, in small plants, calculations on the basis of monitoring
the % sulfur in coal.
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7.Conclusions
In the period 1990-1996 large efforts for the abatement of SO2 and Nox have been made in
the Netherlands
The abatement efforts were not causal linked to the European Directive 88/609/EEC.
There was already substantial regulation on SO2 and Nox emissions of Large Combustion
Plants in the Netherlands.
National implementation as far as integrating 88/609/EEC into national regulation is at
stake, was just a formal bureaucratic exercise. Only one emission limit was changed. This
concerned a minor change.
In the late eighties environment was an important political issue and an important public
issue in the Netherlands. Even a cabinet fell on a minor environmental relevant measure,
elections afterwards were also dominated by environmental issues.
The drivers for the efforts in the late eighties and early nineties were the Dutch national
policy on acidification and, related the political and public interest in environmental issues
in the Netherlands.
A firm Dutch government formulated the expected efforts for several groups (refineries,
power plants, industry, agriculture and traffic to fight acidification). Only the policy
instruments were debatable.
The electricity sector was threatened by stricter regulation
For the electricity sector this was a driver for willing to reach for a covenant with the
central government; the inevitable alternative would have been regulation leaving little
flexibility.
Regulation was perceived by the electricity sector as a risk: how were the efforts going to be
allocated? The electricity sector aimed at goals at the aggregate level. Regulation addresses
the individual power plant.
The believe was that cost-effectiveness would be better in case of the covenant. Efforts to
lower the ambition of central government were without results.
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In 1990 the covenant was signed June 1990. The content was a sharp decrease of SO2
emissions and NOx emissions until the year 2000. Existing regulation would stay in use,
stricter limits were not going to be issued as long as the electricity sector performed as they
agreed upon.
The covenant was satisfying for both government and electricity sector. A substantial
reduction of SO2 and NOx emissions was combined with freedom for the electricity sector
to implement in the most cost-effective way.
The goals were on the aggregate level of the sector and not on the level of individual
electricity plants. The already longer existing regulation was the only constraint on the
individual level. There was no new constraint put on the individual plant.
The electricity sector had to draw up a plan of action in order to implement the covenant.
Law organized the electricity sector. The Sep, the "trade association" of the electricity
sector, was the central player.
The Sep coordinated the electricity supply the public sector, operated the operational
switch on and switch of off of individual power plants. The four large electricity producing
companies in the Netherlands owned the Sep.
The success of the plan of action is found in the close cooperation between the Sep and the
four large electricity producers. The fact that the Sep runs a system of cost pooling was
essential for the openness during the drawing of the plan of action.
The Sep made a first rough draw on the basis of a scenario until 2000, the electricity
producers than brought up alternatives. After a first shakeout, detailed cost studies were
done.
The environmental effects of the covenant were large. SO2 emissions decreased from 43.7
ktons in 1990 to 18.7 ktons in 1996.
To what extends this is a result of the covenant as policy instrument, can be doubted. The
context in which parties agreed upon the covenant was quite clear: it was either the
covenant or regulation.
So the explanation is to be found in the covenant in a context of the thread of regulation.
For new plants existing regulation required substantial abatement efforts. The general
conclusion is that there are no reasons to deny that the covenant was the prime driver for
changes made, still existing regulation and the avoidance of the alternative instrument are
important factors to keep in mind when analyzing the changes made.
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Finally SO2 emissions could have been even less when the new coal-fired plants would not
have been built. The energy-policy on fuel differentiation and the strategy of Sep to secure
cheap fuels explain the building of these new plants. The additional SO2 emissions created
no problems, for the NOx emissions it made no substantial difference.
There was some over-compliance on SO2 emissions, the electricity sector undertook some
effort to fill up this room and decrease costs by (1) lowering the effectiveness of the
abatement equipment and (2) using coals with more sulfurs. The first proposal is not really
exercised, the second is. Both decrease costs.
The over-compliance was caused by a conservative estimate of the abatement equipment,
the use of low sulfur coal, the switch on and switch of policy on coal fired plants and the
closing down of one coal plant years before schedule. It is better not to speak about over-
compliance but about premature compliance to the goals set for 2000.
The individual abatement patterns of power plants diver substantially. The reason for this is
that there are different measures taken.
Six old coals fueled plants without abatement equipment were closed (total capacity 985
Mwe), two new coals fired plants with abatement equipment (total capacity 1200 Mwe)
were built. The average performance of the SO2 abatement equipment was improved a bit
by maintenance and in some years coal that was lower on sulfur was burned.
The % S in coal has some serious impacts on costs. The electricity sector opened the
discussion to use the space available due to over-compliance in order to raise the average %S
in coal. It is calculated that the increase of % S in coal from 0.7 in 1990 to 0.85 in 1996
saved the electricity sector about 30.000.000 guilders in 1996. The additional emissions
caused can be calculated on the basis of the average abatement. The estimate is 2.2 kton.
The cost saving for each ton additional SO2 is therefor about 13600 Dutch guilders (prices
1988). This calculation is under the assumption that abatement is 92 %. If there is no
abatement equipment installed, the saving is only 1088 Dutch guilders for every additional
ton SO2.
The costs for abatement equipment installed can also be estimated.: For six coal fired plants
the available data made it possible to make estimates of the costs for every ton SO2 abated
by the abatement equipment.
There are two versions of this calculation given. The difference is the way the variable
costs are valued. The first estimate results in average costs for each ton SO2 abated of 825-
1269 Dutch guilders. This estimate should be considered a bit low.
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The second estimate result in average costs for each ton SO2 abated of 1084-1557 Dutch
guilders (Prices 1984/1985). Smaller plants in the population have lower absolute abatement
costs, the costs for each ton SO2 abated are relatively higher. The same is true for the
intermediate plants. When the use of the plant is low, abatement costs for each ton SO2
abated, raise strongly.
The European Directive 88/609/EEC did not put new constraints on the power plants.
One should keep in mind that the Sep could not prepare the measures in total freedom. The
fact that the covenant included no additional stricter regulation, this does not mean that
existing regulation was not valid.
Still a closer look at the regulation makes clear that with the coal-fired electricity grid the
degrees of freedom were not that large.
The Plan of action drawn up by the Sep had to take into consideration the constraints from
existing regulation. The covenant did impose additional constraints on the sector as a
whole, not on individual plants. Still existing regulation imposed constraints on individual
power plants.
For the implementation of the covenant the knowledge/information of SEP in the
coordinated structure was important. Starting point for the Sep was cost-effectiveness when
they developed the plan of action, as they were obliged to by the covenant. They used their
normal operating and counting program. All power plants are in and the program is used for
balancing the cost-prizes of electricity producers. This is necessary of course in a system in
the Sep decided when every individual plant has to be switched on or switched of.
On the basis of a scenario until the year 2000, the necessary abatement was known. The
four electricity-producing companies indicated what they could do to decrease emissions.
After a first shake out, detailed costs estimates were made. The openness of the process was
enormous according to the respondents from the Sep. A crucial factor in this was of course
the existence of the cost pooling mechanism.
On administrative costs made by the government trustworthy information is present. About
0.5 full-time staff member was spend on central level and about 3 full time staff-members
was spend on provincial level. There are about 100 power plants, so 9 hours each year was
spend on every power plant and on the level of provinces about 54 hours are spend on
every power plant. On the level of provinces there is a second estimate available with a
range of 30.7 to 89.2 hours for every power plant. The effort for only SO2 emissions is a
lot smaller.
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 On administrative costs for the coal fired power plants the estimates are less trustworthy.
There is only a rough estimate of 3240 hours each year for 600 Mwe plants that could
include some of the technical management of the abatement equipment
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